The storm is blowing. Thousands of gamers are working to support traditional models of training, education and analysis in government and the defense sector. This grassroots movement has evolved in many countries, a joint venture फा Fight Club International मध्ये in which civilian and military players are experimenting with professional technology to demonstrate what they can do for national security challenges. But while technology is at the heart of this initiative, its more fundamental goal is to change culture – military organizations with their characteristic in-depth history and levels of entrenched bureaucracy are no easy feat.

A common hurdle in introducing transformative technology is the user’s imagination — or in other words, the user’s desire to have a real imagination. Initial testing with Fight Club, called structural simulation Combat campaign, Civilian players without military training outperformed military officers with many years of experience. Military players were obsessed with their thinking and adhered to the doctrine. In their frustration, they found that their decision-making speed was lower than that of gamers with more intuition and skill.

In the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, these changes are beginning to take place. Recently, along with the traditional war game, a Royal Marine Major played Combat campaign To explore more faithfully what a potential pet fight would look like in a wargame situation. In doing so, the officer published discrepancies in the corps reconnaissance, which led to the necessary changes in the corps plan. The practice of warfare through experiential learning through sports is enabling combatants to become more adaptable.

Social change

Given the vast budget and direct access to world-leading science and technology, Western armies are most capable of taking advantage of advances in modern computing, data exploitation, and artificial intelligence. Yet, they have an equally important hurdle: conservative institutionalism. These forces face a major social challenge to revitalize state services with transformative capabilities designed for a more efficient future.

Some organizations have a deeper understanding of their past than the military. Consult their history books to understand what it means to lead a young, ambitious military commander. Examples may vary but the themes are the same: physical presence on the battlefield, setting personal examples, motivating followers with words and actions, selfless commitment.

Want to change all this? How can an organization with such deep historical roots adapt to the disruptive forces of modern technology? How do you adapt to a start-up culture when your DNA is tied to the past and stabilized by bureaucracy?

Modern armies will serve institutional lip service to the disruptive capabilities of technological progress, including terms such as “revolution in military affairs” in their professional dictionaries. But how many military leaders would vote to make themselves (or the institutions in which they grew up) obsolete? Individual fears of individual obsolescence, collectively, are an organizational barrier to change. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Frederick W. Technology will do for the military what Taylor did for U.S. industry: if not important to the enterprise, you no longer need it. If this process had not taken place in industry, the United States would have had an outdated and impractical industrial production model, and as a result, economic power would have been greatly reduced. Similarly, if, for fear of obsolescence, they were allowed to stop being in the army, the result would be an outdated, over-matched force – too slow and too inefficient to keep up with rivals.

The human factor is the biggest limitation of technology. Unmanned fighter jets can repel unmanned aircraft if given the relevant G-Force tolerance. Modern autonomous vehicles are estimated to be 70 percent safer than the average driver. Modern ground sensors will detect images and patterns better than man. $ 30,000 drones can locate more than $ 12 million manned reconnaissance vehicles. Yet, there is a reluctance to adopt this technology wholeheartedly, and this stems from the fact that humans like to be relevant ांमध्ये a subjective weakness is acutely felt in institutions built on the foundation of the human example. Witness the powerful story while playing in Top Gun: Awara.

Human still matter

What about man? Pulling the trigger is not a human value, it is a matter of deciding whether to pull the trigger or not. It is the human role to appreciate the strategic context, to appreciate the consequences, and to make ethical decisions. Technologies like AI demand that humans keep doing this, but faster and better. The Fight Club Group in the UK, in partnership with the UK Defense Science and Technology Laboratory, is exploring how games in improved combat can improve human performance, where robots and unmanned platforms are changing the dynamics of battle. Early evidence suggests that the military is not yet ready for this type of battle. It is fast and deadly, requiring new structures and capabilities to cope with the crisis of complexity.

Military needs, along with excellent communications Good men, More speed and able to navigate complex adaptive systems wisely. We need to find and develop modern-day underwriters, who are able to coordinate a symphony of abilities to harmonize the effects on a battlefield affected by sensors.

What about gamers? Well, they can help. If the last century has been defined by the power of motion pictures and moving images, then the interactive power of twenty-first century gaming replaces these linear media experiences. Games generate powerful stories, experiences and most importantly data. Gaming has enormous potential through an uninterrupted collection of learning data. Fight Club is moving in this direction by crowdsourcing insights into the game, introducing new ways of thinking and fighting. From strategy-level matrix games examining ways to compete in gray zone warfare to simulating ways to defeat integrated air defense, the wisdom from the crowd helps identify the right discrepancies for further exploration. This is the way. It leads to discovery, learning and adaptation in peace and war.

It’s more important to change (if not more) how we fight than to buy new things to fight. Games in the U.S. Marine Corps found asymmetrical advantages to reduce the need for heavier and more expensive tanks. The U.S. Air Force takes advantage of the professional game, Order: Professional Edition, Stress on test concepts and purchase information. The United States Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity has conducted research on how it can reduce cognitive bias that affects gaming decision making and intelligence analysis. Studies show that game-based learning enhances the gamer’s ability to create emotion. Clearly, taking advantage of gamers and introducing more gaming can improve strategic performance in defense and government, but will we allow cultural change to take root? Or will institutional bias get in the way?

The world’s leading military academies have portraits of the highest-ranking leaders in history – to use the words of Theodore Roosevelt, who was “actually on the field”. But in the future, by focusing on quick decisions rather than physical examples, if our leaders demand to stay on top of the arena, it is not actually in it. Instead of making emotional calculations influenced by the “sweat and dust and blood” of the battle, they take advantage of the audience’s cold, awkward comfort point to present a clear strategy.

The idea that future commanders are today’s gamers would be unfamiliar to organizations built on practical examples. Still, if we cling to the past and remain steadfast in the present, we will certainly mortgage our future.

Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Moran (British Army) and Colonel Arnell David (US Army) are members of the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps. He conducted and delivered purposefully disruptive experiments to test how AI and machine learning could advance targeting, war games, and decision-making processes and planning methods. No thanks Shashank Joshi And Nicholas Crowe For an early read and review of this article. Any errors or problems are the author’s own.

The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official status of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense, or any organization affiliated with the British Army, or NATO. .

Image Credit: Tech. Sergeant AJ Hayat, US Air Force