In 2030, Beijing reaches a fatal decision: reunification with Taiwan at any cost. Cyber ​​attacks plunge the island into darkness, confusion and fear. The rain of missiles overwhelms Taiwan’s defenses, destroying military bases and communications infrastructure. At sea, the Chinese navy has surrounded the country with hundreds of landing craft speeds across the Taiwan Strait. As U.S. warships approach, they are loaded with missiles, torpedoes, and drones. Videos of Chinese blitz and sinking US ships have surfaced on the Internet. Disappointed, Taiwan refused to take up arms against Chinese troops attacking their shores.

Most people imagine when they think of military war games – scenes from the Pentagon’s gut, digitally fighting units on electronic maps, commanders thinking of their next step in a fast-paced crisis. Victory in simulation, hence the popular imagination, shows how to win the struggle in real life. Defeat in the game of war, on the other hand, is an acknowledgment that any real conflict will be lost.

Contrary to popular belief, however, this is not how war games work. Rarely is a war game designed to predict the future or to develop a single definite strategy. Instead, the game of war helps military planners and analysts find and understand a complex problem regardless of the outcome. Win or lose is not about setting a strategy for the US military, but about helping it understand what it already has, what it can do, and what it needs.

In 2030, Beijing reaches a fatal decision: reunification with Taiwan at any cost. Cyber ​​attacks plunge the island into darkness, confusion and fear. The rain of missiles overwhelms Taiwan’s defenses, destroying military bases and communications infrastructure. At sea, the Chinese navy has surrounded the country with hundreds of landing craft speeds across the Taiwan Strait. As U.S. warships approach, they are loaded with missiles, torpedoes, and drones. Videos of Chinese blitz and sinking US ships have surfaced on the Internet. Disappointed, Taiwan refused to take up arms against Chinese troops attacking their shores.

Most people imagine when they think of military war games – scenes from the Pentagon’s gut, digitally fighting units on electronic maps, commanders thinking of their next step in a fast-paced crisis. Victory in simulation, hence the popular imagination, shows how to win the struggle in real life. Defeat in the game of war, on the other hand, is an acknowledgment that any real conflict will be lost.

Contrary to popular belief, however, this is not how war games work. Rarely is a war game designed to predict the future or to develop a single definite strategy. Instead, the game of war helps military planners and analysts find and understand a complex problem regardless of the outcome. Win or lose is not about setting a strategy for the US military, but about helping it understand what it already has, what it can do, and what it needs.

Whether it’s Taiwan or any other potential conflict, the situation is seldom at the center of the war games we create in the CNA for the US Department of Defense. Instead, the war game is about understanding how the U.S. military can build resilience, what technological gaps could hamper its military, how competing competitors can develop in response to U.S. capabilities, and how it can influence what Washington invests today. Basically, war games themselves try to find and distort the basic nature of the problem – which rarely leads to a definite situation or solution.

In fact, it is impossible to use war games to create a clear strategy. Properly covered, it will withstand a great deal of adverse conditions. On the other hand, trying to simulate a victory in a war game means trying to align future decisions of both sides in a complex conflict with the situation played out during the game. Of course, these decisions are numerous and most of them are beyond one’s control.

Trying to avoid known failures in the game of war is a much richer way to explore. Has the US side failed due to lack of logistics? Was his death due to a missing ability-or was it due to a misconception about the enemy? War games can be designed to focus on only one aspect of the conflict, such as the deployment of the US Navy at the beginning of the Chinese invasion of Taiwan and the emphasis on breaking that aspect. Finding a situation in which the US side fails is invaluable, as it creates an opportunity to overcome weakness. Success, on the other hand, makes it harder to know where to invest and more difficult to convince anyone that it is worth the investment. Failure identifies the critical parts that need to be addressed and the description of the game of war highlights the value of neglect. Through many repetitions, the game of war can provide steady clarity on the way forward.

In 2030, Beijing reaches a fatal decision: reunification with Taiwan at any cost. Cyber ​​attacks plunge the island into darkness, confusion and fear. The rain of missiles overwhelms Taiwan’s defenses, destroying military bases and communications infrastructure. At sea, the Chinese navy has surrounded the country with hundreds of landing craft speeds across the Taiwan Strait. U.S. warships provide significant missile protection to U.S. regional bases under threat. Long-range bombers and guided missiles destroy landing craft approaching Taiwan, giving the country a brief window to their defense and gathering strength against the remaining Chinese troops that have reached their shores.

For a war game to be useful, it is largely irrelevant which potential conflict is played. The game can be used as a background to the Chinese invasion of Taiwan परंतु but only as a case to be used for military investigations. The real takeaway is not about winning or losing a particular battle, but about what comes along the way. Why did the ban fail in the situation? Which competitor’s capability limited the ability of the United States to launch? A meticulous analysis of such questions drives progress in the US military and allows it to enhance its strategic, operational and strategic proficiency. It compels rigorous testing of information exchange, command and control, processes and procedures, and even organizational structures. None of this is really about the Taiwan conflict. But if the United States goes to war – against Taiwan, the Baltic states or any other country – the answers to these questions will help to succeed.

In the words of US Air Force General John Highten, the US side “failed” in the 2020 war game, which included the Chinese attack on Taiwan. (The exact situation remains classified.) But that result was not a disaster created by the press. Failure in a war game is a common feature, not a bug. Haiten’s comments proved the game a success. “[W]We have to make sure that we fail and that we fail quickly and that we can learn from our failures and move forward faster, “he said in the same speech. When military leaders are unwilling to accept failure, they lead the entire Department of Defense to stagnation and safe haven, and open the window of opportunity for opposition. War games are a safe environment to learn to fail fast and succeed.

In 2030, Beijing reaches a fatal decision: reunification with Taiwan at any cost. Cyber ​​attacks plunge the island into darkness, confusion and fear. Equipped with US capability, Taiwan’s defense intercepted an initial wave of Chinese missiles. At sea, the Chinese navy is attacked by unmanned submarines. Hundreds of landing craft across the Taiwan Strait are unsafe and have been destroyed by this invisible force. US warships for weeks on end Escort a steady stream of reinforcement. State-of-the-art missiles launched by long-range bombers, backed by US Marine and Special Forces sensors, sink the remaining fleet approaching the island. Taiwan begins repairing its infrastructure, consolidating its reserves, and stopping for a long time.

The United States can certainly learn from winning war games, but the lessons are usually narrow. What works in a single war game has limited usefulness — he makes specific decisions against a specific opponent using a specific set of rules of the game that may or may not accurately reflect the world. To fail, on the other hand, the game does not have to be a perfect simulation. We often hear complaints from players that our war game rules make the enemy “10 feet tall”. But it is better to put more pressure on the US military than to give too little credit to the opponent and not put enough pressure on the US military. With all sides emphasizing the capabilities of the US military, analysts and researchers can identify vulnerabilities and what is needed to address them.

In 2030, Beijing reaches a fatal decision: reunification with Taiwan at any cost. Cyber ​​attacks plunge military ports along the Chinese coast into darkness, confusion and fear. Hundreds of landing craft, unable to load at the ports, await the next order. Most Chinese missiles targeting Taiwan’s military installations are intercepted by defensive batteries. At sea, the Chinese navy falls prey to advanced mobile mines and hypersonic missiles. U.S. warships lead regional allies and partners in shutting down critical warships, supplies and capabilities on the island. Despite the damage, Taiwan’s infrastructure quickly manages to bring its military and supplies to a defensive position and prepares the nation to repel the next wave.

There are many reasons why none of these narratives are complete. All you have to do is change the whole story. And in any war game नये not to mention real-life struggles असतात there are countless decisions. Just as war games are not about victory or defeat, so the so-called road to war, the initial conditions that trigger the game’s struggle are not seriously determined. Instead, the way players take advantage of current military theories, strategies and capabilities and adapt to them is the dynamic heart of the war game — and apply it to the problems that come their way. Did the predictable actions yield the expected results? Do players have moments of insight or a spark of inspiration when they are improved? New decisions lead to new experiences and new experiences can identify doors that give different and better results.

So, in the game of war, don’t pay attention to who won or lost. It’s about the war-gaming process, not the consequences – and analyzing that process will allow US forces to turn defeat into victory.

In 2030, Beijing reaches a fatal decision: reunification with Taiwan at any cost. The rest of the story? It’s up to you.